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Abstract 
Theoretical studies suggest that corruption may counteract government failure and 
promote economic growth in the short run, given exogenously determined sub optimal 
bureaucratic rules and regulations. As the government failure is itself a function of 
corruption, however, corruption should have detrimental effects on economic growth 
in the long run. In this paper, we measure the rate of economic growth for various 
time spans—short (1998–2000), middle (1995–2000) and long (1991–2000)—using 
previously uninvestigated state-level cross-section data for the United States. Our 
two-stage least square (2SLS) estimates with a carefully selected set of instruments 
show that the effect of corruption on economic growth is indeed negative and 
statistically significant in the middle and long spans but insignificant in the short span. 
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Abstract 
Theoretical studies suggest that corruption may counteract government failure and 
promote economic growth in the short run, given exogenously determined suboptimal 
bureaucratic rules and regulations. As the government failure is itself a function of 
corruption, however, corruption should have detrimental effects on economic growth in 
the long run. In this paper, we measure the rate of economic growth for various time 
spans—short (1998–2000), middle (1995–2000) and long (1991–2000)—using 
previously uninvestigated state-level cross-section data for the United States. Our 
two-stage least square (2SLS) estimates with a carefully selected set of instruments 
show that the effect of corruption on economic growth is indeed negative and 
statistically significant in the middle and long spans but insignificant in the short span. 
 3
1． Introduction 
Concern about the negative social and economic impacts of corruption has grown 
rapidly in both emerging economies and advanced democracies. Major international 
organizations have, as a result, begun examining the sources of, and solutions for, 
corruption. For example, on its website, the World Bank states, “The [World] Bank has 
identified corruption as the single greatest obstacle to economic and social development. 
It undermines development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the institutional 
foundation on which economic growth depends”.1 Similarly, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) states, “Many of the causes of corruption are economic in nature, and so are 
its consequences—poor governance clearly is detrimental to economic activity and 
welfare”.2 Both of these organizations not only support a number of anti-corruption 
programs and initiatives in their over 180 member countries, but also upload working 
papers and data to their websites, organize seminars and conferences, and produce many 
publications. 
Although these international organizations consistently claim that corruption 
hinders economic growth, economists have not necessarily agreed with the claim from 
theoretical standpoints. Empirical studies have also shown mixed results at best. In this 
paper, along this line of growing research, we first carefully review both theoretical and 
empirical studies in the literature, and then estimate the causal effect of corruption on 
                                                  
1 The World Bank, http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/index.cfm (accessed on 
20 January 2005). Also see World Bank (2000). 
2 The IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/gov.htm (accessed on 20 January 2005). 
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economic growth using previously uninvestigated state-level cross-section data for the 
United States. 
We argue that the effect of corruption on economic growth should be estimated 
using a relatively long span of economic growth data for theoretical and practical 
reasons. Theoretical studies suggest that corruption may counteract government failure 
and promote economic growth in the short run, given exogenously determined 
suboptimal bureaucratic rules and regulations. As the government failure is itself a 
function of corruption, however, corruption should have detrimental effects on 
economic growth in the long run. In practice, policymakers and economists care more 
about such long-term consequences of corruption than the short-term effects. 
None of the existing studies, however, examined the corruption effects by 
carefully considering time spans, as well as two other important factors that change 
parameter estimates—instruments and data. In this paper, we conduct two-stage least 
square (2SLS) regressions with various time spans, a carefully selected set of 
instruments, and relatively distortion-free dataset. Specifically, we measure the level of 
economic growth for various time spans—short (1998–2000), middle (1995–2000) and 
long (1991–2000)—and separately estimate the effect of corruption on growth. Our 
cross-section data from a single advanced democracy can reduce the variations in 
cultural, historical, and institutional differences, including qualitative differences in the 
administrative rules and practices, which have vexed the cross-national comparisons 
conducted by earlier empirical studies. We also select proper instruments by testing their 
validity. Considering these factors, we show that the effect of corruption on economic 
growth is indeed negative and statistically significant in the middle and long spans but 
insignificant in the short span.  
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review previous 
theoretical and empirical studies on the causal relationship between corruption and 
economic growth. In Section 3, we explain our data and methods for empirical 
estimation. Section 4 shows the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes this paper. 
2． Corruption and Economic Growth 
In this section, we review theoretical and empirical studies that have investigated the 
impact of corruption on economic growth.3  Although the World Bank and IMF 
presume corruption has significantly negative effects on economic growth, our careful 
reading of the existing studies reveals unsettled arguments and mixed results. 
2.1. Theoretical Studies 
More than 30 years ago, Leff (1964) first argued that corruption might promote 
economic growth as it relaxes inefficient and rigid regulations imposed by government 
(also see Huntington (1968) for earlier arguments). Since the mid 1980s, some 
economists have formalized mechanisms, in which corruption enhances efficiency and 
promotes growth. A “queue model” proposed by Lui (1985) argues that bureaucrats, 
when allocating business licenses to firms, give priority to those who evaluate time at 
the greatest value and bribe the bureaucrats into speeding up procedures. Beck and 
Maher (1986) and Lien (1986) developed “auction models” arguing that bribes in a 
                                                  
3 Many studies examine the effects of corruption on other economic variables, such as 
investment, government expenditure composition, and economic inequality, but we do not 
review these as they are not directly related to the topic of this paper. For a comprehensive 
collection of these studies, see Abed and Gupta (2002). 
 6
biding process can promote efficiency because most efficient firms are often those who 
can afford the highest bribe. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) modeled a bargaining process 
between public and private sectors, eventually echoing Leff’s (1964) proposition by 
arguing that corruption “enables private agents to buy their way out of politically 
imposed inefficiencies” (Shleifer and Vishny 1994:1013). A related argument is that 
corruption “may make possible smaller or no salary payments to officials who, if 
carefully supervised, will still carry out their functions on a fee-for-service basis” 
(Tullock 1996:6; also see Becker and Stigler 1974). 
Some scholars, such as Tanzi (1998:582) and Aidt (2003:634–35), have 
recently refuted these arguments for various reasons. First, private firms paying a high 
bribe are not necessarily economically competitive firms. If a firm with potentially 
talented individuals engages in rent-seeking activities instead of more productive 
activities, such a sub-optimal use of human capital will damage macroeconomic growth 
(also see Baumol 1990; Lui 1996; Murphy et al. 1991). In fact, private firms are often 
forced to make side-payments to government officials to run their business in many 
countries, such as Indonesia (Sjaifudian 1997), Russia (Shleifer 1996) and Ukraine 
(Kaufmann 1997), and the cost of such corruption is particularly high for small but 
emerging enterprises, which can be a driving force of economic growth. 
Second, corruption acts as an arbitrary tax for those giving bribes to public 
officials, as they have to bear the cost of searching for “partners” and negotiating with 
them. Because of such rent-seeking costs, Aidt (2003) argues, the auction model’s claim 
that bribery is equivalent to competitive auction (as the same firm wins the prize at the 
same price under two arrangements) is invalid. Furthermore, when corrupt officials 
rather than the treasury collect revenues from individuals and firms, an opportunity to 
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lower the tax burden is lost (see also Goulder et al. 1997). 
Finally, government officials intentionally impose rigidities in order to extract 
bribes, thus officials know that the more rigidities they impose the more opportunity 
they have for extracting bribes. Similarly, if bribes are used to speed up procedures, 
bureaucrats may further slow down the administrative procedures (see also Andvig 
1991; Myrdal 1968:Chapter 20).4 In short, when corruption allows public officials to 
receive private benefits secretly and arbitrarily, they do not perform their expected role 
of fixing market failures, and instead create even more market failures. The 
government’s fundamental role of protecting property rights is also distorted, and its 
accountability and transparency are diminished (see also Boycko et al. 1996; Farrell 
1987). 
We regard the last argument as particularly important. As some economists 
argue, corruption may work as the second-best solution to market distortions imposed 
by government procedures and policies at least in the short run. In the long run, however, 
corruption itself produces further market distortions and reduces market efficiency. 
Indeed, Lui (1996:28) writes, “corruption has two effects; (i) a positive level 
[short-term] effect on allocative efficiency; and (ii) a negative effect on the economy’s 
long-term growth rate”. Although the first effect still remains a matter of debate, there 
seems to be no theoretical disagreement for the latter. Furthermore, in practice, what 
policymakers and economists often care about is not the short-run effect but the 
long-run effect.  
For this reason, theoretically motivated and practically important empirical 
                                                  
4 There is a counterargument to this claim. Based on a formal model, Lui (1985) argued that 
government officials do not cause administrative delays to attract more bribes. 
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studies should focus on testing the long-run negative effect of corruption on growth. To 
highlight its importance and differences between short-term and long-term estimates, 
however, in this paper, we conduct regressions with different time spans and compare 
their estimates. 
2.2. Empirical Studies 
Below, we first introduce extant empirical estimates of corruption’s effect on economic 
growth, and then discuss various methodological problems that are thought to cause the 
mixed findings in the literature. 
A pioneering work by Mauro (1995) examines the impact of corruption using 
Business International’s (1984) corruption index and growth rates of per capita GDP 
from 1960 to 1985 (Summers and Heston 1988). Using these variables, Mauro 
(1995:702–3) shows that a one-standard-deviation decrease in the corruption index 
significantly increases the annual growth rate of GDP per capita by 0.8 per cent 
(specifically, in Model 6, Table 7). As this finding is based on a simple regression with 
an instrumental variable (the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization) but without 
control variables, it is not robust, as Mauro himself admits (1995:701). After controlling 
for other variables, including investment, the effect of corruption becomes insignificant 
(see Models 8 and 10, Table 7). 
Mo (2001) also uses long-term economic growth rates of per capita real GDP 
from 1970 to 1985, originally prepared by Barro and Lee (1993).5 This study shows 
                                                  
5 Mo (2001:69) gives the following explanation for using the long-term growth rate: “To study 
the determinants of the growth rates of total factor productivity and the capital stock, we need a 
relatively long observation period”. 
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originality, albeit controversial, in estimating a “direct” effect of corruption, as well as 
“indirect” effects of various transmission channels (i.e., investment, human capital, and 
political instability), through which corruption could affect economic growth. 
Specifically, Mo runs a regression using Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index, variables measuring the three transmission channels, and other 
control variables. He also obtains a marginal effect of each transmission variable on 
corruption with three separate regressions, and defines the “total” effect of corruption as 
the marginal (“direct”) effect of corruption on growth plus a sum of transmission 
variables’ “indirect” effects, each of which is the marginal effect of each transmission 
variable on growth multiplied by the marginal effect of corruption on each transmission 
variable.6 By using this method he shows that a one-unit increase in the corruption 
index reduces the growth rate by about 0.545 percentage points (i.e., the “total” effect) 
and that the most important channel is political instability, which accounts for 53 per 
cent of the “total” effect (2001:Table 6). Mo also uses instrumental variables (i.e., 
regional dummies and the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization) and obtains similar 
negative effects (2001:Table 8). The validity of the instrumental variables is, however, 
not properly tested. We should also note that the “direct” effect of corruption on growth, 
after controlling other variables, is insignificant in both OLS and 2SLS estimations (see 
Model B6, Table 2, and Model AP6, Table 8, in Mo (2001:72, 77–8)). 
A recent study by Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) applies the same 
decomposition method suggested by Mo (2001), but uses a longer period to measure 
economic growth (i.e., real GDP per capita from 1975 to 1996) and considers another 
                                                  
6 His rationale for using this decomposition method is that the level of multicolinearity between 
corruption and these transmission variables is expected to be high. 
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transmission channel of trade policies.7 They also consider the endogeneity problem 
and conduct a set of 2SLS regressions with a valid instrumental variable that passes the 
Hausman test; that is, legal origins (Fredriksson and Svensson 2003). Their conclusion 
is similar to Mo’s (2001)—namely, in both OLS and 2SLS regressions, the transmission 
variables are significantly influenced by the level of corruption. We should, however, 
note that, while a simple OLS (Model 1, Table 1 (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004:434)) 
indicates that corruption has a significantly negative effect on growth, this negative 
effect becomes insignificant in a 2SLS regression (Model 13, Table 7 (Pellegrini and 
Gerlagh 2004:449)). Furthermore, with all control variables, the “direct” effect of 
corruption is insignificant in both OLS and 2SLS regressions (Model 3, Table 1 
(Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2004: 434); Model 15, Table 7 (Pellegrini and Gerlagh 
2004:449)) and it even shows a positive effect in the 2SLS regression. 
There are two other related studies that do not rely on the decomposition 
method and conduct standard OLS regressions with control variables (but without 
instrumental variables). Rock and Bonnett (2004) check the robustness of the 
conventional argument (i.e., the negative effect of corruption on growth and investment) 
using four different corruption indices, and find similar negative impacts of corruption 
on economic growth. Yet, these effects are significant only conditional on model 
specification (Rock and Bonnett 2004:Tables 2–4). More interestingly, they show that 
corruption in the large East Asian newly industrializing economies (i.e., China, 
Indonesia, Korea, Thailand and Japan) significantly promotes economic growth (Rock 
                                                  
7 Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004:443) argue that the observation period of the dataset Mo (2001) 
had used is short, and that data with a longer time span “can help us to appreciate the pervasive 
effect of corruption on growth”. 
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and Bonnett 2004:Table 4). The observation period in their study varies depending on 
“[d]ata constraints, particularly on corruption variables, [which] led to estimation of 
four different sets of cross-country regressions for four different time periods—1980–83, 
1988–92, 1984–96 and 1994–96” (Rock and Bonnett 2004:1005). 
Abed and Davoodi (2002) also run a standard multivariate regression. They use 
panel and cross-sectional data for 25 countries over the period 1994–98, and examine 
the roles of corruption in transition economies. Compared with other studies, their study 
uses data with a much shorter time span. The results (Abed and Davoodi 2004:Table 4) 
show that higher growth is associated with lower corruption in both panel and 
cross-sectional regressions and denoted significance at one per cent level. But this effect 
is insignificant with panel data when their structural reform index, which may in part 
measure the degree of government failure, is included. 
In sum, these empirical studies show mixed results at best. Some may present 
unbiased estimates, while others may present biased ones. To figure out the causes of 
varying empirical estimates, we discuss below various possible methodological 
problems in the existing studies, before introducing our data and specification in the 
next section. 
First, as we discussed earlier, any theoretically-driven and practically-relevant 
study should estimate the long-term effects of corruption. Abed and Davoodi (2002), 
however, use data for the period 1994–98. Using such short-term data presents a 
methodological problem; namely, economic growth in the short-term is influenced by a 
number of unobserved or immeasurable short-term factors, some of which may be 
systematic rather than stochastic. Such short-term random and non-random factors can 
“average out” in the long-run. 
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Second, theoretical models imply that we need to control for the effects of 
suboptimal government regulation in order to estimate the marginal effects of corruption 
alone on economic growth.8 Most studies do not attempt to control this variable. An 
exception is Abed and Davoodi’s (2002) reform index, but it may not be a valid 
indicator of the government failure. It is typically very difficult, if not impossible, to 
measure the degree to which government regulation is suboptimal. 
Third, if this important control variable is immeasurable, or measurable only 
with serious measurement error, a standard solution is to find an appropriate 
instrumental variable (or a set of instrumental variables). Rock and Bonnett (2004) and 
Abed and Davoodi (2002), however, do not attempt to control omitted variable bias 
using instruments. Other studies do, indeed, run the two-stage least square (2SLS) 
regressions with instrumental variables, but with the exception of Pellegrini and Gerlagh 
(2004) do not report the validity of their instruments. Hence, their 2SLS regressions 
may use “weak” instruments, which produce even more serious bias and inefficiency 
than standard OLS regressions (Staiger and Stock 1997). 
Fourth, when estimating the long-term effect of corruption on economic growth, 
as theoretical studies imply, we should consider the effect of corruption on government 
failure. To put it differently, we should note that the government failure is causally prior 
to corruption in the short run but is causally posterior in the long run. One may thus 
                                                  
8 Schleifer and Vishny (1994:1013) address this problem. “One way to reconcile this argument 
[i.e., that corruption increases efficiency] with the evidence [by Mauro (1993)] is to note that 
corruption goes hand in hand with the extent of political control, and hence the empirical 
observation that corruption is bad for growth simply reflects the fact that government regulation 
(omitted from the regression) is bad for growth.” 
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argue that such posterior-government failure should be taken into account by adding 
appropriate indicators, as independent variables, in order to estimate the unbiased 
“direct” effect of corruption on growth. This argument is invalid, because inclusion of 
variables that are consequences of the key causal variable (in our case, corruption) 
introduces severe “post-treatment” bias (Frangakis and Rubin 2002; Greenland 2003). 
This recent statistics literature also implies that the decomposition method used by Mo 
(2001) and Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) is problematic as it explicitly includes 
independent variables that are theoretically and empirically consequences of corruption. 
Therefore, the “total” effect of corruption, in the long-term, should be estimated by 
dropping any post-treatment variables. 
Fifth, all existing studies use cross-national data, making it difficult to control 
for a number of cultural, historical, and institutional differences, including qualitative 
differences in administrative rules and practices, across observations. 
Finally, our review of the theoretical literature implies that we should carefully 
distinguish between the short-term vs. long-term effects of corruption on economic 
growth when empirically estimating the causal effects of corruption on economic 
growth. No study has yet been conducted comparing the causal effects of corruption for 
different time spans, so the possible varying effects of corruption over time have not yet 
been analysed. 
3． Data and Methods 
We consider the theoretical implications and methodological problems discussed in the 
previous section and take the following approach. First, we use state-level, cross-section 
data for the United States to minimize unobservable but non-stochastic differences 
 14
across observations. Second, we measure economic growth using three different time 
spans and compare the results. Third, we carefully use instrumental variables and test 
their validity. Finally, we do not use the problematic decomposition method, exclude 
variables that are consequences of corruption, and measure the “total” effect of 
corruption on growth. We explain our data and variables in detail below. Descriptive 
statistics of all variables are shown in Table 1. 
The total number of observations in our cross-state data for the United States is 
46. Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New Jersey are dropped because the value of 
our key independent variable (i.e., corruption) is missing for these states. Louisiana is 
also dropped due to missing data on an instrumental variable (i.e., political competition). 
The descriptive statistics introduced in this section (Table 1) are based on 46 
observations. 
The dependent variable, GSP Growth Rate, is measured by the annual growth 
rate of the real Gross State Product (GSP) per capita for various time spans—short 
(1998–2000), middle (1995–2000) and long (1991–2000).9 The average across states is 
1.3 per cent (1998–2000), 2.4 per cent (1995–2000), and 2.2 per cent (1991–2000). The 
states with the highest and lowest economic growth rates are Alaska and Oregon, 
respectively—in Alaska growth averaged –0.4 per cent (1998–2000), –1.7 per cent 
(1995–2000), and –1.1 per cent (1991–2000); and in Oregon 3.6 per cent (1998–2000), 
5.9 per cent (1995–2000), and 4.6 per cent (1991–2000). 
                                                  
9 We obtain GSP data from the Statistical Abstract of the United States published by the US 
Department of Commerce. The growth rate is defined as (1/T)•ln(Yi,t/Yi,t-T), which is used in 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), where Yi,t-T is the real GSP per capita of i-th state in the initial 
year. 
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The key causal variable is Corruption Index. The cross-state index of 
corruption is obtained from Boylan and Long (2002), who conducted a survey of state 
house reporters’ perceptions of public corruption in their state in 1998. State house 
reporters were asked to rate the level of corruption among all employees in the state 
government (including elected officials, political appointees, and civil servants) on a 
scale from one to seven (least corrupt to most corrupt). The average of such “local” 
reporters’ opinions is used as a measure of corruption in each state.10 The states with 
the lowest Corruption Index value in log (0.41) include Colorado, North Dakota and 
South Dakota; Rhode Island is found to be the most corrupt state (1.71). The mean of 46 
states is 1.18 and the standard deviation is 0.36. 
Note that the Corruption Index is measured in 1998, whereas GSP Growth Rate 
is the annual growth for the periods between 1998 and 2000, 1995 and 2000, and 1991 
and 2000. Conceptually, what we ought to measure is the “stock” level of corruption in 
each state during the period of investigation. Practically, however, the Corruption Index 
is measured only once in a particular year during the period of investigation. This 
measurement error in the key causal variable is one of the two reasons why we must 
carefully find instrumental variables. 
We consider, however, that using our Corruption Index is not a critical problem 
for two reasons. First, this index is based on state house reporters’ perceptions, which 
may be shaped by observations and experiences over more than any particular year. 
More importantly, using the same independent variable while measuring the dependent 
variable (i.e., GSP Growth Rate) in multiple ways depending on time spans, allows us to 
                                                  
10 We acknowledge problems of using a survey-based measure of corruption and, in the 
concluding section, discuss an alternative measure for our future research. 
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compare how the same variable could have different consequences on economic growth. 
Based on the existing empirical studies of economic growth, we also use a set 
of control variables. All variables are taken from the Statistical Abstract of the United 
States published by the US Department of Commerce. The initial real GSP per capita 
is used to account for difference in state’s economic development level and to capture 
plausible convergence effects (Barro 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1995). Education 
(the number of enrolments in public elementary and secondary schools as a proportion 
of the total number of persons aged 5–17) is a proxy for the level of human capital stock. 
Investment (nominal domestic investment as a proportion of nominal GSP) estimates 
the effect of investment on economic growth, while government expenditure (state 
and local governments’ consumption expenditure as a proportion of nominal GSP) to 
estimate the effect of government consumption expenditure on economic growth.11 
Finally, metropolitan population (the share of state population living in metropolitan 
areas) estimates the effect of urbanization on economic growth. To avoid post-treatment 
bias, all these variables are measured in the initial year—1991, 1995 or 1998. Note that 
all independent variables, including the Corruption Index, are in log, thus we can 
directly compare the magnitude of these variables’ effects. In our semi-log functional 
form, the slope coefficient measures the absolute change in GSP Growth Rate (i.e., 
percentage point change) for a given relative change in an independent variable.12 
As we discussed earlier, however, theoretical studies suggest the existence of 
                                                  
11  The total expenditure of both state and local governments excludes their education 
expenditure. 
12 Note that the elasticity estimate is the slope coefficient multiplied by the value of the GSP 
Growth Rate, indicating that the elasticity is variable. 
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another important variable, which is nevertheless difficult, if not impossible, to 
measure—each state’s level of government failure and resultant suboptimal rules and 
regulations. Controlling this potential omitted variable bias is another important reason 
to find appropriate instrumental variables. 
To find valid instruments, we reviewed studies examining determinants of 
corruption. For example, Tanzi (1998) summarizes the causes, consequences, and scope 
of corruption, and discusses possible corrective actions, from a cross-national 
perspective. Treisman (2000) presents several hypotheses regarding the determinants of 
corruption and empirically tests them using cross-national data. While these studies use 
cross-national data, Meier and Holbrook (1992) and Alt and Lassen (2003) estimate the 
determinants of political corruption using cross-section data for the United States.  
Based on these studies and our preliminary empirical tests, we choose to use the 
following two variables. The first is a dummy variable for a region with the lowest 
average corruption level. That is Plains Dummy, which is one for Iowa, Kansas, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota.13 These states may 
have some institutional, cultural or historical factors preventing corruption, but these 
state-specific factors may not necessarily have direct effects on economic growth. The 
second instrumental variable is Political Competition (in log), which is taken from 
Holbrook and van Dunk (1993). This measure, which ranges from 0 to 100 (before 
taking a log), is based on district-level state legislative election results from 1982 to 
1986; high values on this index indicate high levels of competition. Political 
competition is considered an outcome of political institutions and campaign finance 
                                                  
13 Our division of states into regions is that used in Statistical Abstract of the United States. 
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restrictions, and is found to be an important predictor of corruption (Alt and Lassen 
2003). This political variable is also expected to influence the level of economic growth, 
but only indirectly through corruption. 
4.  Regression Results 
The results of 2SLS regressions (second stage) and specification tests for the validity of 
instrumental variables are summarized in Table 2. The results of the first-stage 
regressions are presented in Table 3. 
Before examining the estimated marginal effects of our causal variable, we 
discuss the appropriateness of our model specification. First, we examine potentially 
high levels of collinearity among independent variables, by calculating VIF (variance 
inflation factors) of each independent variable (not-reported). Since the mean VIF is 
quite low (about 1.3) for each regression, we do not need to be concerned about 
multicolinearity. The adjusted R-squared statistic is 0.15 in the short-term (1998–2000), 
0.34 in the middle-term (1995–2000), and 0.41 (1991–2000) in the long-term. The 
longer the data period, the higher the adjusted R-squared statistic, which is consistent 
with our expectation, as stochastic and non-stochastic factors tend to average out in the 
longer period. The low F-statistics (i.e., the high P-value) in the regression using 
short-term data implies that the model has no overall explanatory power. As we 
discussed, this is one of the methodological reasons why we emphasize the importance 
of estimating the long-term determinants of economic growth. 
Table 2 also presents two types of test statistics for instrumental variables. The 
high value of the F-statistic (i.e., the low P-value) rejects the null hypothesis that a set of 
instruments is jointly zero in the first-stage regression. In the nR-squared test proposed 
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by Hausman (1983)—a more appropriate test for assessing the validity of instruments if 
more than one instrument is used—the low value of Chi-squared statistic (i.e., the high 
P-value) suggest that a set of instrumental variables can predict corruption and be 
excluded in a model explaining the level of economic growth. All three regressions pass 
these tests, suggesting the validity of using Political Competition Index and Plains 
Dummy as the instruments of Corruption Index. 
The most important findings in Table 2 are that the sign of Corruption Index is 
negative in each of these three regressions (but the effect is small and insignificant in 
the short-run) and that the magnitude of the effect is more than double in the middle and 
long run. Figure 1 summarizes our findings graphically. Each panel shows the estimated 
marginal effect of Corruption Index (on the vertical axis, ranging from the minimum 
value to the maximum value, not in log) on GSP Growth Rate (on the horizontal axis, in 
per cent), while holding all the other independent variables constant at their means. A 
dot and a vertical line show the mean and 95 per cent confidence interval of prediction. 
It clearly shows that the marginal effects are large in the middle and long spans. When 
the level of corruption changes from the minimum (1.5) to the maximum (5.5), the GSP 
Growth Rate will decline by 2.4 percentage points in the long-run and 2.6 percentage 
points in the middle-run. These are quite large effects. In the short-run, the magnitude of 
the effect is smaller and the level of uncertainty is larger. This figure also suggests that 
the confidence intervals of predictions are narrower in the long-run than in the 
middle-run. These results suggest that the longer the period, the larger the negative 
effect and the more confident our prediction becomes. These empirical findings are 
consistent with theoretical arguments—whether corruption promotes growth given the 
government failures (in the short run) is still controversial, but there is no theoretical 
 20
disagreement that it hinders growth in the longer period as corruption creates further 
government failures. 
Table 2 also shows some other interesting findings. Real GSP per capita in the 
initial year is negative and significant in the middle and long runs. They confirm Barro’s 
“convergence” theory of economic growth. Among all independent variables in these 
regressions, the initial income has the largest absolute effect (–2.92 in the middle run 
and –3.16 in the long run). The positive effects of Metropolitan Population are also 
significant in the middle and long runs. This result implies that urbanization and the 
resultant concentration of resources have been an important driving force of economic 
growth in US states. The initial amount of investment (measured by Investment) and the 
level of human capital stock (measured by Education) are found to be insignificant. The 
government expenditure also has no effect. 
The results of the first-stage regressions (Table 3) are also worth close attention 
and interpretation. They show that the two instrumental variables, Political Competition 
Index and Plains Dummy, are significantly negative at the conventional level. The only 
exception is the estimate of Political Competition Index in the middle run. As Alt and 
Lassen (2003) argue, the high level of political competition lowers the level of 
corruption. As we discussed, region specific factors reduce the corruption problems in 
the Plains states. 
What is equally important and interesting is that Metropolitan Population has a 
significantly positive effect on corruption. Note that it also has a significantly positive 
effect on economic growth. On the one hand, as Meier and Holbrook (1992) argue, 
urbanization fosters conditions conducive to corruption because government programs 
and resources are concentrated in the cities. On the other hand, such urban environments 
 21
foster economic growth. These results suggest that we may estimate a positive effect of 
corruption on economic growth if the effect of urbanization on growth is not properly 
controlled. The omission of the urbanization variable may be another reason why the 
existing studies show unstable and mixed estimated effects of corruption on growth.  
5.  Conclusion 
Although international organizations, such as World Bank and IMF, now presume the 
negative effect of corruption on economic growth, our careful readings of existing 
studies suggest that theoretical models show different implications and empirical 
findings are mixed. In this paper, using a previously uninvestigated, but relatively 
distortion free, dataset for the United States with various time spans and valid 
instruments, we re-estimated the effects and confirmed the significantly negative effect, 
especially in the long and middle spans. Corruption is indeed one of the “greatest 
obstacles to long run economic and social development”.14 
 We believe our estimates are less biased than previous estimates, but 
acknowledge some further ways to improve analysis. First, we should seek an 
alternative measure of corruption at the subnational level in the United States. As 
Golden and Picci (2005) argue, survey-based measures of corruption have some 
intrinsic measurement problems because these measures are often based on perceptions 
of corruption rather than experiences of it. They are also problematic because 
respondents may have an incentive to underreport the level of corruption if they are 
involved in it. The selection of “experts” on each country/state’s government–business 
                                                  
14 The World Bank, http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/index.cfm (accessed 
on 20 January 2005). Also see World Bank (2000). 
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relationships may also be biased. As a possible alternative that minimizes these potential 
sources of invalidity and unreliability, we plan to measure the Golden–Picci index of 
corruption for the United States.15 This measure is based on the difference between the 
amounts of physical public capital and the amounts of investment cumulatively 
allocated for these public works. Examining whether our estimates are different from 
those based on this alternative measure is one of the top priorities for future research. 
We also hope to create the same corruption measure for other countries, such as 
Japan. Compared with the perceptions-based cross-national measures commonly used in 
previous studies, these subnational-level corruption measures for various countries are 
expected to improve greatly our understanding of the causes and consequences of 
corruption. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Period Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
GSP Growth 1998–2000 1.289 0.677 –0.400 3.600 
 1995–2000 2.433 1.106 –1.700 5.900 
 1991–2000 2.241 0.934 –1.100 4.600 
Corruption Index 1998 1.177 0.362 0.405 1.705 
Real GSP Per Capita 1998 3.363 0.156 3.036 3.715 
 1995 3.276 0.162 2.998 3.775 
 1991 3.198 0.191 2.872 3.784 
Investment 1998 –1.230 0.210 –1.801 –0.846 
 1995 –1.279 0.210 –1.789 –0.933 
 1991 –1.225 0.248 –1.942 –0.835 
Government Expenditure 1998 –1.905 0.178 –2.284 –1.300 
 1995 –1.852 0.365 –2.321 0.274 
 1991 –1.983 0.168 –2.319 –1.419 
Education 1998 4.519 0.035 4.441 4.584 
 1995 4.523 0.036 4.438 4.594 
 1991 4.526 0.040 4.432 4.616 
Metropolitan Population 1998 4.139 0.356 3.329 4.572 
 1995 4.120 0.384 3.170 4.572 
 1991 4.091 0.391 3.161 4.557 
Political Competition Index 1998 3.612 0.368 2.226 4.036 
Plains Dummy All years 0.152 0.363 0 1 
Note: GSP Growth is in per cent. All other variables except Plains Dummy are in natural 
log. The number of observations is 46. 
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Table 2: 2SLS Regression Results (Second Stage) 
 1998–2000 1995–2000 1991–2000 
Corruption Index –0.86 –1.99 –1.82 
 (–1.45) (–2.45) (–2.80) 
Real GSP Per Capita –0.14 –2.92 –3.16 
 (–0.18) (–2.99) (–4.71) 
Investment 0.33 0.20 0.71 
 (0.68) (0.27) (1.31) 
Government Expenditure –0.32 –0.35 –0.40 
 (–0.55) (–0.89) (–0.60) 
Education –0.90 –2.20 –0.24 
 (–0.31) (–0.51) (–0.08) 
Metropolitan Population 0.63 1.89 1.53 
 (1.33) (3.46) (3.58) 
Constant 3.99 16.10 9.35 
 (0.29) (0.79) (0.65) 
Number of observations 46 46 46 
F(6, 39) 0.79 2.99 6.31 
Probability > F 0.58 0.02 0.00 
R-squared 0.26 0.43 0.49 
Adjusted R-squared 0.15 0.34 0.41 
Root MSE 0.62 0.90 0.72 
F Test    
F(2, 38) 6.35 7.45 7.33 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 
nR-squared Test    
Chi-squared(2) 1.77 2.36 1.53 
Probability > Chi-squared 0.18 0.12 0.22 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. Instrumental variables are Political 
Competition Index and Plains Dummy. 
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Figure 1: Estimated Marginal Effect of Corruption on GSP Growth Rate 
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Note: A dot and a vertical line indicate the mean and 95 per cent confidence interval of 
prediction. All the other independent variables are held constant at their means.  
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Table 3: 2SLS Regression Results (First-Stage) 
 1998–2000 1995–2000 1991–2000 
Political Competition –0.30 –0.23 –0.32 
 (–2.12) (–1.68) (–2.32) 
Plains Dummy –0.32 –0.39 –0.34 
 (–2.34) (–3.01) (–2.38) 
Real GSP Per Capita –0.16 –0.04 –0.02 
 (–0.45) (–0.13) (–0.06) 
Investment 0.04 0.13 0.12 
 (0.18) (0.55) (0.58) 
Government Expenditure 0.28 –0.14 0.22 
 (0.98) (–1.10) (0.71) 
Education –1.65 –2.02 –1.97 
 (–1.16) (–1.40) (–1.49) 
Metropolitan Population 0.43 0.26 0.30 
 (2.63) (1.79) (2.20) 
Constant 9.14 10.17 10.70 
 (1.34) (1.47) (1.68) 
Number of observations 46 46 46 
F(7, 38) 4.23 4.76 4.75 
Probability > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.44 0.47 0.47 
Adjusted R-squared 0.33 0.37 0.37 
Root MSE 0.30 0.29 0.29 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are t-statistics. 
 
 
